Changing Media, Changing China

changing media, changing china This knave intention either(a)y left blank CHANGING MEDIA, CHANGING CHINA redact by Susan L. hornswoggle 2011 Oxford University Press, Inc. , publishes bleeds that further Oxford Universitys objective of virtue in re attempt, scholarship, and education. Oxford un utilise York Auck push d birth Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur capital of Spain Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi nobble Siamesepei Toronto With offices in genus Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Re unexclusive France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Sin commotionore s breakheast Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine VietnamCopyright 2011 by Susan L. Shirk Published by Oxford University Press, Inc. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 www. oup. com Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No pitch forth of this military personnelityation whitethorn be re masterfessional persondu ced, stored in a retrieval ashes, or transmitted, in all form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or early(a)wise, with proscribed(a) the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in- pop Data changing media, changing china / edited by Susan L. Shirk. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN 978-0-19-975198-3 978-0-19-975197-6 (pbk. ) 1. Mass mediamainland mainland china. 2. Mass media and finish chinaw ar. I. Shirk, Susan L. P92. C5C511 2010 302. 230951dc22 2010012025 1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2 Printed in the United asserts of America on acid- exon geological erate makeup Contents 1. ever-changing Media, changing chinaw ar 1 Susan L. Shirk 2. chinas Emerging Public Sphere The Impact of Media Commercialization, Professionalism, and the net professional personfit in an Era of Transition 38 Qian Gang and David Bandurski 3. The Rise of the Business Media in mainland chinaw ar Hu Shuli 4. Between P ropaganda and Commercials Chinese Television Today 91 Miao Di 5.Environmental journalism in chinawargon Zhan Jiang 115 77 6. Engineering Human Souls The victimisation of Chinese Military Journalism and the Emerging Defense Media Market 128 Tai Ming Cheung 7. changing Media, changing Courts 150 Benjamin L. Liebman 8. What Kind of breeding Does the Public Demand? Getting the parole during the 2005 Anti-Japanese Protests 175 Daniela Stockmann 9. The Rise of Online Public suasion and Its Political Impact 202 Xiao Qiang 10. ever-changing Media, ever-changing Foreign Policy Susan L. Shirk Ack outrightledgments 253 Contri hardlyors 255 Index 259 225 vi Content 1 ever-changing Media, ever-changing mainland chinaware Susan L.Shirk ver the past thirty years, the leadinghip of the Chinese Communist caller (CCP) observe relinquished their monopoly everyplace the understanding reaching the frequent. Beginning in 1979, they allowed un drug ab applys cover, cartridge holders, a nd video recording and radio stations to support themselves by selling advertisements and competing in the marketplace. wherefore in 1993, they funded the construction of an cyberspace ne bothrk. The frugal logic of these decisions was obvious requiring aggregate media organizations to ? nance their operations through technical activities would reduce the disposals burden and military service modernize Chinas economy.And the mesh would help catapult the coun bear witness into the ranks of technologically advanced nations. But less create is whether Chinas loss leadinghip anticipated the profound policy- make repercussions that would follow. This entreaty of essays explores how transformations in the intimacy environmentstimulated by the potent f consummation of mercenary media and net ar changing China. The essays atomic number 18 written by Western China experts, as well as by pioneering diarists and experts from China, who compile from individual(prenomin al) experience slightly how television, bare-assedbornspapers, magazines, and net-based pa component part program sites navigate the just somewhattimes unreliable crosscurrentsO amid the market and CCP views. Although they involve different vitrines of media, the essays share common themes and subjects the plosion of discipline make available to the ordinary through market-oriented and net in hail-based word of honor sources how slew seek credible randomness how the population burst informed than invariably in the leadis making new demands on disposal activity how ordaineds react to these demands the ambivalency of the leadership as to the bene? s and endangerments of the superfluous ? ow of information, as well as their instinctive and strenuous efforts to shape populace opinion by dogmatic cloy and the ways in which journalists and Netizens are evading and resisting these chastenesss. Following a skeleton retrenchment after(prenominal) the Tiananme n crackdown on student demonstrators in June 1989, the commercialization of the plenteousness media picked up steam in the 1990s. 1 Today, watchwordpapers, magazines, television stations, and intelligence service electronic network sites compete ? rcely for audiences and advertising r tear downue. After half a century of beingness effectiveness-fed CCP propaganda and starved of real information somewhat municipal and international aftermaths, the Chinese humankind has a voracious appetite for intelligence agencyworthiness. This appetite is virtually apparent in the growth of lucre nark and the weather vane,2 which need multiplied the arrive of information available, the variety of sources, the timeliness of the intelligence information, and the national and international reach of the give-and-take program.China has more(prenominal)(prenominal)(prenominal) than 384 million profits users, more than any other country, and an astounding cxlv million bloggers. 3 The around dramatic effect of the Internet is how turbulent it feces afford information, which in overrule helps skirt ex officio blackballship. Because of its promote, the Internet is the ? rst place news bulge outs it sets the agenda for other media. Chinese Internet users look on coterminous to instantaneously nigh as yetts happening overseas and throughout China.Thanks to the study news Web sites that compile articles from thousands of sources, including television, newspapers and magazines, and online nationalations bid blogs, and disseminate them amplely, a cyanogenetic waste site or corruption shit in any Chinese city or a politicians lecture in Tokyo or Washington be come ins headline news crossways the country. Other complementary technologies, such(prenominal) as cadre phones, amplify the stupor of the Internet. Millions of large number get news bulletins text messaged automatically to their cell phones. China is nonetheless mute a long way f rom having a save weight-lift.As of 2008, China s excessivelyd close to the bottom of world rankings of freedom of the arouse 181 out of 195 countriesas assessed by the international nongovernmental organization (NGO) freedom House. 4 Freedom House withal sanctifys a low 2 Changing Media, Changing China score to Chinas Internet freedom78 on a scale from 1 to 100, with 100 being the worst. 5 The CCP continues to monitor, censor, and manufacture the heart of the discharged mediaincluding the Webalthough at a more than higher cost and less thoroughly than before the proliferation of news sources.During chairman Hu Jintaos second term, which began in 2007, the interrupty ramped up its efforts to manage this new information environment. What at ? rst looked a resembling temporary measures to counteract destabilizing protests in the lead-up to the 2008 Olympics and during the twentieth anniversary of the Tiananmen crackdown and other governmental anniversaries in 2009 now s eem to perk up plump a permanent system. Apparently the CCP depart do whatsoever it takes to make sure that the information reaching the public through the commercial media and the Internet does non inspire pack to challenge caller rule.Information foc victimisation has become a source of serious friction in Chinas relations with the United says and other Western countries. In 2010, Google, reacting to cyber attacks originating in China and the Chinese governments intensi? ed controls over free speech on the Internet, threatened to quarter out of the country unless it was allowed to hold an un? ltered Chinese linguistic communion search locomotive engine. 6 (capital of Red China had acquire Google to ? lter out substantive the Chinese government considers politically sensitive as a discipline of doing business in China. Nine days later, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, in a speech virtually the Internet and freedom of speech that had been be after before Goog les announcement and that did not focus on China or the Google controversy, articulated Internet freedom as an explicit ending of American foreign policy. 7 The Chinese government was stunned and alarm by the Google announcement. Googles challenge did not just sully Chinas international paper it in addition threatened to mobilize a dangerous plateful(prenominal) tushlash. A senior propaganda positive I interviewed verbalized dismay that Google executives had make a high-pro? e threat instead of using the computable relationship the Propaganda division had established with company executives. A capital of Red China academic heard a senior formalized say that the government was treating the Google crisis as the digital version of June 4, referring to the Tiananmen crisis, which to the highest degree brought down Communist Party rule in 1989. In the ? rst twenty-four hours after Googles dramatic pronouncement, angry and excited Netizens crowded into chat rooms to applaud Googles defense Changing Media, Changing China 3 of free information.Google has totally a 2530 percent share of the search engine business in Chinathe Chinese-owned Baidu has been favored by the government and more or less consumers except Google is strongly preferred by the members of the highly educated urban elite. 8 To prevent the controversy from adjoinring up op flummox from this in? uential group, the Propaganda Department went to work. Overnight, the dominant opinion appearing on the Internet cancelled 180 degrees against Google and the United States. 9 The pro-Google messages disappeared and were replaced by accusations against the U.S. government for colluding with Google to subvert Chinese sovereignty through its information imperialism, thitherby creating suspicions that umpteen of the new postings were bogus. The Propaganda Department asked paying attentioned Chinese academics to submit supportive newspaper essays, and housed ghostwriters. Online news portals wer e required to devote space on their front pages to the governments counterattacks. To stage itself against the threat of a astronomic-scale figurehead of Google devotees, the CCP fell back on anti-American nationalism.In borderland 2010 Google followed through on its threat and moved its search engine to Hong Kong as a result, the Chinese government and not Google now does the ? ltering. Despite the unique features of the Google case, international as well as house servant con? icts over censorship are comparablely to be recurrent as the caller struggles to shape an increasingly pluralistic information environment. In her bulk Media Control in China, primitively print in 2004 by the international NGO Human Rights in China, journalist He Qinglian lambasts the CCP for its limits on compaction freedom. She renders Chinese journalists as dancing in shackles. Yet she as well assign commercialization with break a gap in the Chinese governments control of the news media. 10 Indeed, the arguing for audiences provides a strong motivation for the force per unit area to break a news humbug before the propaganda government can implement a ban on saying itand it has provided an unprecedented space for protest, as was seen in the initial joggle of pro-Google remark. Caught between commercialization and control, journalists play a cat and mouse granulose with the censors, a dynamic that is vividly depicted in the case studies in this book.Even partially pass on control of the mass media transforms the strategic interaction between rulers and the public in authoritarian political systems bid China. Foreigners tend to inhabit on the way the Chinese propaganda cops are continuing to censor the media, but an equally grave 4 Changing Media, Changing China part of the story is the exponential expansion of the amount of information available to the public and how this is changing the political game deep down China. That transplant is the subject of this book.OFFICIAL ambivalency As journalist Qian Gang and his coauthor David Bandurski argue in ch quicker 2, Chinese leaders have a deep ambivalence toward the commercial media and the Internet they recognize its emf bene? ts as well as its jeopardys. Xiao Qiang, in chapter 9, uses the a care(p) term to describe the attitude of Chinese authorities toward the Internet. By choosing to give up some degree of control over the media, the rulers of authoritarian countries like China make a trade-off. Most obviously, they gain the bene? t of economic development the market operates more efficiently when people have better information.But they also are gambling that they ordain reap political bene? ts that relinquishing control of the media lead set off a dynamic that will result in the improvement of the governments performance and ultimately, they hope, in streng henceing its favorite support. The media improve governance by providing more consummate information regarding the prefe rences of the public to policymakers. National leaders also use media as a watchdog to monitor the actions of subordinate officials, in particular at the topical anaesthetic level, so they can identify and try to ? x problems before they recruit popular unrest.Competition from the commercial media further drives the official media and the government itself to become more innocent to preserve its credibleness, the government essential release more information than it ever did before. In all these ways, the transformed media environment improves the responsiveness and enhancer of governance. Additionally, a freer pressing can help earn international approval. On the other accomplish, surrendering control over information creates severe political risks. It puts new demands on the government that it may not be able to satisfy, and it could split up to the public the divisions behind the facade of party unity.Diminished control also provides an opening for political opposition to emerge. What most worries CCP leadersand what motivates them to continue investing to a great extent in mechanisms to control media messageis the potential that a free information environment provides for organizing a challenge to their rule. The Chinese leaders fear of Changing Media, Changing China 5 free-? owing information is not perfect paranoia some comparative affectionate science research indicates that allowing coordination goods like press freedom and civil liberties consecratei? antly reduces the odds for authoritarian regimes to survive in forefinger. 11 What is the connection between information and antigovernment corporate action? The more repressive a regime, the more dangerous it is to coordinate and engage in corporate action to change that regime. Each individual dares to participate save if the risk of participating is outweighed by the potential bene? ts. oneness way to minimize the risk is the anonymity afforded by large returns. Standing on Tiana nmen feather carrying an antiregime sign is an act of political suicide if you are alone.It all told makes sense to picture if you know that a crowd will turn out. Even before the Internet was created, news stories could create focal items for mobilizing mass protests. Cell phones and the Internet are even more useful for coordinating group action as they provide anonymity to the organizers and facilitate two-way intercourse of many to many. In April 1999, approximately ten thousand devotees of the Falun Gong spiritual religious sect used cell phones and the Internet to secretly organize a go to that surrounded the CCP and government leadership compound in Beijing.A decade before, the telefax machine was the communication technology that made it possible for students to organize pro-democracy protests in Beijings Tiananmen Square and more than 130 other cities. As the chapters in this book detail, in recent years a gang of newspaper reports, Internet communication tools, and cell phones has enabled student protests against Japan, demonstrations against rural land seizures, and protests against environmentally damaging industrial projects.The political possibilities of the latest social net on the job(p) technologies like Twitter (a homegrown Chinese version is FanFou), Facebook (a Chinese version is Xiaonei), or the videosharing program YouTube (a Chinese version is Youku) have yet to be amply tested in China. 12 As Michael Suk-Young Chwe points out in his book Rational Ritual, media communication and other agents of culture make coordination possible by creating common knowledge that gives each person the knowledge that others have get the same message. 3 When all news was communicated through official media, it was used to mobilize support for CCP policies hence, the CCP had few worries just more or less popular opposition. Thomas Schelling made this point with a characteristically apt analogy The participants of a full-blooded dance may all be thoroughly dissatis? ed with 6 Changing Media, Changing China the particular dances being called, but as long as the caller has the microphone, nobody can dance anything else. 14 As the number and variety of microphones have change magnitude, so have the force of public opinion and the risk of bottom-up mass action.The CCP propaganda authorities may have been reading Schelling A June 2009 concourses Daily translation titled The Microphone Era says, In this Internet era, everyone can be an information channel and a principal of opinion expression. A ? gurative relation is that everybody now has a microphone in front of him. 15 Examples like the 2009 antigovernment protests in Iran and the so-called color revolutions in precedent Soviet states, as well as their own experiences, make Chinese politicians afraid that the free ? ow of information through the new media could threaten their rule.But it is worth considering the other possibility, namely, that the Internet might actu ally impede a successful revolutionary bowel movement because venting online is a safer option than taking to the streets and the de profoundized nature of online communication splinters movements instead of integrating them into effective revolutionary organizations. 16 Nevertheless, Chinas leaders are too nervous to risk completely ceding control of information. MASS MEDIA IN TOTALITARIAN CHINA In the prereform era, China had no journalism as we know it, provided propaganda.Highly advised of public opinion, the CCP devoted a huge amount of resources to managing popular views of all discharges. 17 In CCP lingo, the media were called the throat and tongue of the party their sole map was to mobilize public support by acting as loudspeakers for CCP policies. 18 The Chinese public received all of its highly homogenous information from a small number of officially controlled sources. As of 1979, there were but sixty-nine newspapers in the consummate country, all run by the party and government. 9 The standard template consisted of photos and headlines glorifying local anaesthetic and national leaders on the front page, and invariably positive reports written in formulaic, ideological prose inside. local anaesthetic news stories of interest such as ? res or crimes were around never reported. What microscopic foreign news was provided had to be based on the dispatches of the governments Xinhua News Agency. People read the Peoples Daily and other official newspapers in the morning at work offices and factories were required to have subscriptions.The 7 p. m. news on Changing Media, Changing China 7 China Central Television (CCTV) simply rehashed what had been in the Peoples Daily. 20 Newspaper editorials and commentaries were read aloud by strident voices over ubiquitous radio loudspeakers and then(prenominal) used as materials for obligatory political study sessions in the workplace. A steady nutriment of propaganda depoliticized the public. As politi cal scientist Ithiel de Sola Pool observed, When regimes impose insouciant propaganda in large doses, people stop listening. 21 CCP members, government officials, and politically sophisticated intellectuals, however, had to tarry attentive. To get the information they needed to do their jobsand to survive during the campaigns to criticize individuals who had made ideological mistakes that periodically swept through the bureaucraciesthe elite deciphered the coded language of the official media by reading between the lines. Sometimes this esoteric communication was intended as a signal from the top CCP leaders to subordinates about an impending change in the official line. 2 Kremlinology and Pekinology developed into a high art not only in foreign recognition agencies, but also within Soviet and Chinese government clubs themselves. In chapter 8, Daniela Stockmann describes survey research that she completed which shows that government officials and people who work with the governm ent continue to read the official press to track policy trends. A diet consisting solely of official propaganda left people craving trusted sources of information. 23 As in all totalitarian states, a wide information gap divided the top leaders from the public.Senior officials enjoyed ample access to the international media and an extensive system of internal intelligence gathered by news organizations and other bureaucracies (called neican in Chinese). But the vast majority of the public was left to rely on rumors picked up at the teahouse and personal observations of their neighborhoods and workplaces. (In modern democracies, the information gap between officialdom and the public has disappeared intimately entirely U. S. government officials carry on television sets on in their offices and learn about international events ? st from CNN, not from internal sources. ) MEDIA REFORM Beginning in the early 1980s, the structure of Chinese media changed. Newspapers, magazines, and tele vision stations received cuts in their government subsidies and were driven to enter the market and to earn revenue. 8 Changing Media, Changing China In 1979 they were permitted to sell advertising, and in 1983 they were allowed to retain the pro? ts from the sale of ads. Because people were eager for information and businesses insufficiencyed to advertise their products, pro? ts were good and the number of publications grew rapidly.As Qian Gang and David Bandurski note in chapter 2, the commercialization of the media accelerate after 2000 as the government sought to strengthen Chinese media organizations to harbor competition from foreign media companies. By 2005, China published more than two thousand newspapers and nine thousand magazines. 24 In 2003, the CCP eliminated mandatory subscriptions to official newspapers and ended subsidies to all but a few such papers in every province. Even nationally circulated, official papers like Peoples Daily, Guangming Daily, and Economics D aily are now change at retail stalls and compete for audiences.According to their editors, Guangming Daily sells itself as a spiritual homeland for intellectuals Economics Daily markets its timely economic reports and the Peoples Daily promotes its authoritativeness. 25 About a dozen commercial newspapers with national circulations of over 1 million readers are printed in nonuple locations throughout the country. The southern province of Guangdong is the headquarters of the cutting-edge commercial media, with triad newspaper groups ? ercely competing for audiences. Nanjing now has ? e newspapers competing for the evening readership. People buy the new tabloids and magazines on the newsstands and read them at home in the evening. Though almost all of these commercial publications are part of media groups led by party or government newspapers, they look and sound completely different. In stemma to the stilted and formulaic language of official publications, the language of the com mercial press is fresh and colloquial. Because of this difference in style, people are more apt to believe that the guinea pig of commercial media is true.Daniela Stockmanns research shows that consumers seek out commercial publications because they consider them more credible than their counterparts from the official media. According to her research, even in Beijing, which has a particularly large proportion of government employees, only about 36 percent of residents read official papers such as the Peoples Daily the rest read only semiofficial or commercialized papers. Advertisers and many of the commercial media groups target sisterile and middle-aged urbanites who are well-educated, affluent consumers.But publications also seek to differentiate themselves and court to speci? c Changing Media, Changing China 9 audiences. The Guangdong-based publications use domestic muckraking to attract a business-oriented, cosmopolitan audience. Because they push the limits on domestic pol itical reportingtheir editors are ? red and replaced a great dealthey have make an audience of vainglorious-minded readers outside Guangdong Province. According to its editors, Southern Weekend (Nanfang Zhoumo), published by the Nanfang Daily group under the Guangdong Communist Party Committee, considered one of the most critical and politically in? ential commercial newspapers, has a larger news bureau and greater circulation in politically charged Beijing than it does in southern China. 26 The Communist Youth Leagues popular national newspaper, China Youth Journal, has been a commercial success because it appeals to Chinas yuppies, the style-conscious younger generation with money to spend. The national foreign personal business newspaper, Global Times, tries to attract the same demographic by its often sensory nationalistic reporting of international affairs, as I discuss in chapter 10.Media based out of Shanghai, the journalistic capital of China before the commie victory i n 1949, are comparatively very dull and quiet, correspond to Chinese media critics. The cause they cite is that the citys government has been backward to relinquish control. 27 Shanghai audiences prefer Southern Weekend, Global Times, and Nanjings Yangtze Evening News to Shanghai-based papers, and Hunan television to their local stations. 28 Journalists now look of themselves as pros instead of as agents of the government.Along with all the other changes referred to above, this role change began in the late 1970s. Chinese journalists started to travel, study abroad, and encounter real journalists. The crusading former editor in chief of the magazine Caijing (Finance and Economy) and author of chapter 3, Hu Shuli, recalls that before commercialization, the news media were regarded as a government organization rather than a watchdog, and those who worked with news organizations sounded more like officials than professional journalists. But our teachers . . . encouraged us to pursu e careers as professional journalists. 29 Media organizations now compete for the best young talent, and not bad(p) journalists have been able to bid up their salaries by changing jobs frequently. Newspapers and magazines are also recruiting and spreeing high salaries to bloggers who have attracted large followings. Yet most journalists still receive low base salaries and are paying by the article, which makes them susceptible to corruption.Corruption ranges from small transportation subsidies and honoraria provided to reporters for coverage of government and corporate news conferences to outright 10 Changing Media, Changing China corporate bribery for positive reporting and extortion of corporations by journalists threatening to write damaging exposes (see chapter 3). Establishing professional journalistic ethics is as difficult in Chinas Wild West version of early capitalism as it was in other countries at a similar stage of development. Some journalists also have crossed over to political advocacy.In one unprecedented incarnate act, the national Economic Observer and twelve regional newspapers in March 2010 published a sharply worded joint editorial calling on Chinas legislature, the National Peoples Congress, to abolish the system of household residential permits (hukou) that forces migrants from the countryside to live as second-class citizens in the cities. 30 The authorities banned dissemination and discussion of the editorial but only after it had received wide distribution. At the legislative session, government leaders proposed some reforms of the hukou system, but not its abolition as demanded by the editorial.MEDIA liberty AND government CONTROL All authoritarian governments face hard choices about how often effort and resources to invest in controlling various forms of media. In China, as in many other nondemocracies, television is the most tightly controlled. As Chinese television expert Miao Di explains in chapter 4, because of television s great in? uence on the public todayit is the most important source of information for the majority of the population, reaching widely into rural as well as urban areasit remains the most tightly controlled type of medium in China by propaganda departments at all administrative levels. All television stations are owned by national, provincial, municipal or county governments and used for propaganda purposes. Yet television producers must pay oversight to ratings and audiences if they want to earn advertising revenue. As Miao Di puts it, television today is like a doublegendered rooster propaganda departments want it to crow while ? nance departments want it to lay eggs. The way most television producers reconcile these competing objectives is to produce soft and harmless entertainment programs, not hard news or commentary programs.Yet exceptions exist Hunan television has found a niche with a lively nightly news show that eliminates the anchor and is reported directly by no-neck tie journalists. Changing Media, Changing China 11 In the print realm, the government controls entry to the media market by requiring every publication (including news Web sites with original content) to have a license and by limiting the number of licenses. Only a handful of newspapers, magazines, and news Web sites are completely independent and closely ? nanced. The rest may have some private ? ancing but remain as part of media groups headed by an official publication and subordinate to a government or CCP entity that is responsible for the news content and appoints the chief editors. The chief editor of Global Times, appointed by the editors and CCP military commission of Peoples Daily, acknowledged this in my interview with him If we veer too far away from the familiar direction of the upper level, I will get ? red. I know that. However, there is a degree of variation. For example, magazines are somewhat more loosely controlled than newspapers, presumably because they appe ar less frequently and have smaller readerships.Additionally, newspapers focusing on economics and business appear to be allowed wider latitude in what they can safely report. The publication that set a new standard for bold muckraking journalism is Caijing (Finance and Economics), a privately ? nanced independent biweekly business magazine with a comparatively small, elite readership. In chapter 3, former Caijing editor in chief Hu Shuli explains that the Chinese governments control of the economic news arena, both in terms of licensing and supervision, has been relatively loose when examined with control over other news . . so much so that even in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square event of 1989, economic news was little affected by censorship, while all other kinds of news were strictly monitored and controlled. Her analysis of the emergence of ? nancial journalism in China recognizes the pathbreaking role of private entrepreneurs and professional journalists, but also credi ts the reform-minded economic officials who appreciate the importance of a free ? w of information for the effective functioning of a market economy. She notes that these economic officials didnt call out the CCP Propaganda Department even when Caijing broke an embarrassing scandal about the Bank of Chinas IPO in Hong Kong at the very time when the National Peoples Congress was bes its annual meeting this is considered a politically sensitive period during which the propaganda authorities usually ban all bad news. Evan Osnos, in his New Yorker pro? e of Hu Shuli, observes that the differences among senior officials on media policy may protect Caijing the magazine had gone so far already that conservative branches of the government could no longer be sure which other officials supported it. 31 12 Changing Media, Changing China In 2010, Hu Shuli and most of the stave of Caijing resigned in a con? ict with the magazines owners over editorial control and established Caixin Media, whic h publishes a weekly news magazine (Century Weekly), a periodic economic review (China Reform), and a Web site (Caing. com). Caixin is the ? st media organization in China to establish a Board of Trustees to safeguard its journalistic integrity. Caijing, its reputation damaged by the mass exodus of its journalists, is seeking to recoup by publishing exciting stories such as one that urged that Hubei governor Li Hongzhong be ? red if he failed to apologize for ripping a journalists tape recorder out of her hand when she challenged him at a press conference with a question he didnt like. 32 The heated competition between the two media groups is likely to drive them to surmisal beyond business journalism with taboo-breaking stories that test the tolerance of the government.Although Chinas leaders have embraced the Internet as a necessary element of the information infrastructure for a modern economy, as the size of the online public has grown, they have invested more and more heavily in controlling online content and containing its goodly potential to mobilize political opposition. The Internet offers individuals the means to learn about fast-breaking events inside and outside China, to write and disseminate their own commentaries, and to coordinate collective action like petitions, boycotts, and protests.The concept of the Netizen (wangmin) is laden with political meaning in a system lacking other forms of democratic participation. 33 As Xiao Qiang, the UC Berkeleybased editor of China Digital Times, observes in chapter 9, The role of the Internet as a communications tool is specially meaningful in China where citizens previously had little to no prospect for unconstrained public self-expression or access to free and uncensored information.Furthermore, these newfound freedoms have developed in spite of stringent government efforts to control the medium. From the standpoint of the CCP leaders, the Internet is the most potent media threat. Young and well-ed ucated city dwellers, whose loyalty is crucial for the survival of CCP rule, ? ock to the Internet for information, including information from abroad. 34 That is wherefore the CCP reacted so defensively to the Google showdown and ? rmly refuses to permit un? ltered searches.Additionally, the Internets potential for many-to-many two-way communication facilitates the coordination of collective action around the common knowledge of online information. There is no way for CCP leaders to predict whether virtual activism will serve as a harmless outlet for venting or a means to mobilize antigovernment protests in the street. Changing Media, Changing China 13 politics controls include the Great Firewall, which can block entire sites located abroad and inside China and ingenious technological methods to ? ter and debar searches for keywords considered disloyal. But as Xiao Qiang notes in chapter 9, the governments primary strategy is to hold Internet service providers and access provid ers responsible for the behavior of their customers, so business operators have little choice but to proactively censor content on their sites. In addition, human monitors are paid to manually censor content. Ever since the Mao Zedong era, the methods used by CCP leaders to inculcate political loyalty and ideological conformity have re? cted an acute consciousness that peer groups have a more powerful impact on individual attitudes than authority ? gures. It is for this reason that every Chinese citizen was required to support regular criticism and self-criticism in small groups of classmates or coworkers. Todays propaganda officials are applying this insight to their management of the information environment created on the Internet. To sum up its censorship methods and neutralize online critics, the CCP has introduced a system of paid Internet commentators called the Fifty-Cent array (wu mao dang).Individuals are paid approximately ? fty cents in Chinese cash for each anonymo us message they post that endorses the governments position on controversial issues. Local propaganda and Youth League officials are particularly keen to adopt this technique. 35 These messages create the impression that the tide of social opinion supports the government, put social and psychological pressure to conform on people with critical views, and thereby presumably reduce the possibility of antigovernment collective action.The July 2009 regulation that bans news Web sites from conducting online polls on current events and requires Netizens to use their real names when posting reactions on these sites appears to have the same function of disrupting antigovernment common knowledge from forming on the Internet. 36 The large commercial news Web sites Sina. com, Sohu. com, and Netease. com are probably the second most widely used source of information in China after television, and the ? rst place better-educated people go for their news.These sites have agreements with almost e very publication in China (including some blogs) and many overseas news organizations that allow them to compile and create their content and make it available to millions of readers. They are privately owned and listed on NASDAQ , but they are politically compliant, behaving more or less like arms of the government. To keep their privileged monopoly status, they cooperate closely with the State Council Information dapple, which sends the managers of the 14 Changing Media, Changing China Web sites SMS text messages some(prenominal) times a day with guidance on which topics to avoid.The Information portion also provides a list of particularly independent publications that are not supposed to be featured on the front page. The news sites have opted to reduce their political risks by posting only hard news material that has ? rst been published elsewhere in China. Although they produce original content about such topics as entertainment, sports, and technology, they never do so wit h respect to news events. Furthermore, with very rare exceptions, such as the 9/11 attacks, they never publish international media accounts of news events directly on the site.Despite the CCP hovering over it, the Internet constitutes the most freewheeling media space in China because the speed and de exchangeized structure of online communication present an insuperable obstacle to the censors. In Xiao Qiangs words from chapter 9, When one deals with the blogosphere and the whole Internet with its redundant connections, millions of overlapping clusters, self-organized communities, and new nodes maturement in an explosive fashion, total control is well-nigh impossible. In the short time before a posting can be deleted by a monitor, Netizens circulate it far and wide so it becomes widely known.For example, speeches from foreign leaders, like President Obamas inaugural direct, are care to the full excerpted on television and in newspapers to cast China in the most positive light. Ye t on the Internet you can ? nd the full, unedited version if you are motivated to search for it. There is no longer any hope for authorities to prevent the possibly obnoxious statements about China by politicians in Washington, Tokyo, or Taipei, or the cell phone videos and photographs of violent protests in Lhasa or Urumqi, from reaching and arousing reactions from the online public.Once news attracts attention on the Internet, the audienceseeking commercial media are likely to pick it up as well. Xiao Qiang argues that the mount up of online public opinion shows that the CCP and government can no longer maintain absolute control of the mass media and information, and that the result is a power shift in Chinese society. HOW ARE THE COMMERCIAL MEDIA AND cyberspace CHANGING CHINESE POLITICS? Like all politicians, Chinese leaders are concerned ? rst and foremost about their own survival. A rivalry leader could try to oust them.A mass protest movement could rise up and overthrow th em, especially if a rival leader Changing Media, Changing China 15 reaches out beyond the inner circle to lead such a movement. If leaders lose the support of the military, the combination of an elite split and an opposition movement could defeat them. The trauma of 1989 came close to doing just that. Thousands of Chinese students demonstrated in Beijings Tiananmen Square and over 130 other cities, and CCP leaders disagreed on how to handle the demonstrations.The CCPs rule might have ended had the military refused to obey leader Deng Xiaopings order to use lethal force to disperse the demonstrators. In that same year, democracy activistics brought down the Berlin Wall, and communist regimes in the Soviet unification and Eastern Europe began to crumble. No wonder that since 1989, Chinas leaders have worried that their own days in power are numbered. Because commercial journalism was still in its infancy and the Internet had not yet been built, the mass media played a more minor rol e in the 1989 crisis than it has since then.During the crisis, students, frustrated by what they considered the biased slant of the official press, spread the word about their movement by giving interviews to the foreign press and sending faxes abroad. One market-oriented publication, the World Economic Herald, based in Shanghai, face up down Jiang Zemin, then the party secretary of the city, and published uncensored reports. The recalcitrant journalists at the Peoples Daily and other official papers, with the thanksgiving of some liberal-minded officials in the Propaganda Department, reported freely on the student movement for a few days in May.The Communist Party leaders were almost as worried about the journalists rebellion as they were about the students one. 37 After the crackdown, party conservatives closed down several liberal newspapers including the World Economic Herald and blamed the crisis in part on the loosening controls over the press that had been introduced by fo rmer leaders Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang. 38 Since Tiananmen, Chinese leaders have paid close attention to the destabilizing potential of the media.The formula for political survival that they adopted, based on their 1989 experience, focuses on 3 key tasks39 Prevent large-scale social unrest bend public leadership splits Keep the military loyal to the CCP The three dicta are interconnected if the leadership group remains cohesive despite the competition that inevitably arises within it, then the CCP and the security police can keep social unrest from spreading out of control 16 Changing Media, Changing China and the government will survive.Unless people receive some signal of permission from the top, protests will be suppressed or ? zzle out before they grow politically threatening. But if the divisions among the top leaders come into the open as they did in 1989, people will take to the streets with little fear of punishment. Moreover, were the military leadership to split or a bandon the CCP, the entire regime could collapse. Though commercialization of the media and growth of the Internet have consequences across all three dimensions, today their effects are felt chiefly in the efforts to prevent large-scale social unrest.As the chapters in this book describe, the media and Internet are changing the strategic interactions between leaders and the public as the leaders struggle to head off unrest and maintain popular support. WATCHDOG JOURNALISM HOW TO REACT WHEN THE DOG BARKS As noted earlier, the politicians at the top of the CCP are of two minds about whether the media and Internet prevent or encourage large-scale social unrest. On the positive side, the media and Internet provide information on problems so that national leaders can address them before they cause crises.But on the negative side, the market-oriented media and Internet have the subversive effect of facilitating collective action that could turn against CCP rule. The elites extreme point nervousness about potential protests makes them highly responsive when the media report on a problem. The pressure to react is much greater than it was in the prereform era when the elite relied entirely on con? dential internal reporting within the bureaucracy to learn about problems on the ground. Once the media publicize an issue and the issue becomes common knowledge, then the government does not dare tailor it.Chinese journalists take particular pride in exposes that actually lead to amend governance and changes in policy. One of the earliest and best examples was the reporting about the 2003 expiry in grasp of Sun Zhigang, a young college alumna who had migrated to Guangdong from his native Hubei Province. Qian Gang and David Bandurski, as well as Benjamin Liebman, describe in chapters 2 and 7 how the initial newspaper story published by the Southern Metropolis Daily, a bold Guangdong commercial newspaper, circulated Changing Media, Changing China 7 throughout the countr y on the major news Web sites and transformed Suns death into a cause celebre that sparked an emotional outpouring online. This emotional outpouring in turn inspired a group of law students to take the issue of the detention and repatriation of migrants directly to the National Peoples Congress. Only two months after the ? rst article, Premier Wen Jiabao signed a State Council order abolishing the perpetrate of apprehending migrants who did not carry a special identi? ation card and shipping them back to their homes. Although such instances of actual change in policy are rare, public apologies by high-level officials in response to media criticism are fit more common. In 2001, Premier Zhu Rongji became the ? rst PRC leader to apologize to the public for a get across when he took responsibility for an explosion that killed forty-seven children and staff in a rural school where the students were manufacturing ? reworks.Premier Zhu initially had endorsed the far-fetched explanation offered by the local officials of a deranged suicide bomber. But when, despite a blackout of the Chinese media, the accounts of Hong Kong and foreign journalists who had interviewed villagers by telephone spread in China over the Internet, Premier Zhu offered his apology in a televised press conference. 40 Premier Wen Jiabao has followed the example of his predecessor. He apologized for the melamine-tainted milk and infant formula that killed six and sickened hundreds of thousands of babies.The massive food safety story was originally suppressed by propaganda authorities in the lead-up to the 2008 Olympics, but the scandal was embarrassed by the local press in Gansu Province and the official Xinhua News Service following the games. Premier Wen also apologized for the crippling snowstorms in January 2008 that stranded millions of Chinese eager to get home for the Spring feast break. To de? ect blame and show how responsive it is to media revelations of official negligence or malfe asance, the primaeval government also has sacked the senior officials implicated in such scandals.The number of such highpro? le ? rings or resignations has increased over the past decade with the growth of investigative journalism. Several good examples are described in this book. Increasingly, officials at all levels are making a conspicuous show of their receptiveness to online public opinion. They publicize their chats with Netizens. Government agencies have opened up Web sites for citizens petitions. Law enforcement officers have head start inviting Netizens to provide infor18 Changing Media, Changing China mation for their criminal investigations.In one case, a creative local propaganda official who was a former Xinhua reporter invited a number of bloggers to join a commission investigating the suspicious death of a prisoner. The bloggers had ridiculed as implausible the polices explanation that the prisoner had walked into the cell wall during a blindmans bluff game among t he prisoners they plan police brutality must be the explanation. The debate died down after the commission released a report that said they knew too little to close what had happened and the provincial prosecutors announced the prisoner had not died during a game but had been beaten by another prisoner.The official proudly explained that he had defused the issue by showing that public opinion on the Internet must be solved by means of the Internet. 41 MONITORING topical anesthetic OFFICIALS Every government needs information about how its officials are execute their jobs in order to effectively implement its policies. The top officials of Chinas thirty-three provinces are appointed by the CCP central leaders in Beijing. Yet the central leaders are continually frustrated by their inability to get regional officials to follow their orders.In a rapidly growing market economy, the old top-down bureaucratic methods of monitoring local officials are no longer working. Local officials bene? t more by colluding with local businesses to promote economic growth by spending on better-looking development projects than by providing such social goods as environmental protection, health care, education, and quality food and medicine that are mandated but not fully funded by the central government. Corruption at the local level is rampant.Yet the paltry provision of social goods by corrupt local officials could heighten public resentment against the government and threaten CCP rule on the national level. Theoretically, there are several ways that Beijing could resolve the dilemma of how to pull off the performance of local officials. It could allow citizens to elect their own local leaders. It also could permit independent NGOs to monitor the performance of local leaders. A fully autonomous court system in which prosecutors put corrupt officials on trial and citizens sue for the bene? s being denied them also would help. But CCP leaders have been too afraid of losing control to undertake such implicit in(p) institutional reforms. They have chosen instead to rely on the mass media to serve as a ? re alarm to alert Changing Media, Changing China 19 the centre of attention to problems at lower levels. 42 From their perspective, using the media looks like a less dangerous approach because they still license media outlets and appoint most of their top editors, thereby retaining some power to rein in errant outlets. Media revelations of local malfeasance also bene? t the center by de? cting blame for problems away from themselves and onto local officials. The publicity appears to be working surveys indicate that Chinese people are more critical of the performance of local officials than of central ones, in contrast to the exemplar in American politics. The centers interest in using the media to monitor local officials has been evident since the mid-1990s. CCTV, with the encouragement of the powerful propaganda czar Ding Guangen (see chapter 2), cr eated a daily program called Focus (Jiaodian Fantan) to investigate issues at lower levels in 1994.Miao Di, in chapter 4, discusses Focus in some detail. The program was blessed with high-level political support, having been visited by three Chinese premiers and praised by Chinas cabinet, the State Council. The show attracted a wide viewership and strengthened the credibility of television news overall. However, because local officials intervened so frequently to block exposes of their misdeeds, the show now has become much less hard-hitting.The central authorities tolerate greater press bareness on the type of problems that, if left unreported and unsolved, might stir up serious popular dissatisfactionin particular, problems with water and air taint as well as food and medicine quality. Some national-level environmental officials have become adept at using media events such as, televised hearings on the environmental impact of important projects to mobilize public pressure on lo wer-level officials to comply with centrally adopted policies that are environmentally conscious.Veteran journalist Zhan Jiang describes the pattern in chapter 5, on environmental reporting as a general rule the center has an interest in receiving information that reduces the information gap between the center and localities regarding potentially volatile problems resulting from negligence by local officials. However, as he illustrates with the case of the Songhua River chemical spill once journalists pull the ? re alarm and alert Beijing and the public to a crisis, then the center tries to reassert control over the media to cool off ublic emotions and experience an image of a competent government that is solving the problem. Recently, the central official media have been given the green light to pull the alarm on abuses by local officials. For years, reports have been circulating in the foreign human rights community and the international press about provincial and municipal gove rnments that detain local citizens who have 20 Changing Media, Changing China come to Beijing to petition central officials about their grievances with local officials.They lock up the petitioners in il sanctioned detention centers (black jails) on the outskirts of Beijing, ostensibly for legal education, and then ship them back home. In November 2009, the official magazine panorama (Liaowang) broke the story of these illegal jails and the report appeared on the Xinhua Web site. 43 Not surprisingly, local officials are wary of media watchdogs and do what they can to repugn them out. As Tsinghua University journalism professor Li Xiguang has noted, The central government, in the ? ght against the widespread corruption of the local government, encourages journalists to write exposes of the corruption.But the local governments are very much protective of themselves and of their power, so there is a con? ict between the central government and the local government in dealing with jour nalists. 44 censorship by provincial and local branches of the CCP Propaganda Department and the State Council Information Office is viewed by journalists as tighter than that at the national level. The essays in this book offer numerous examples of local governments blackouts of critical news stories and the strategies journalists and activists use to evade them.Ever since the 1990s, regional commercial newspapers have been doing investigative reporting of corruption and other abuses on the part of local officials, but only outside their own home provinces. This practice is called cross-regional reporting (yidi jiandu). Since all local newspapers are part of media groups belonging to the local government and CCP establishment, editors naturally are inhibited from biting the hand that feeds them. Exciting stories about the sins of other peoples officials may be second best but are better than nothing.Reporters are automatic to brave police harassment or violent attacks by paid thug s to get the goods on bad governance by officials in other places. Often they dont have to go to the scene to report the story. As Ben Liebman describes in chapter 7, journalists blocked by local bans from writing about local malfeasance can simply e-mail the information to colleagues from other regions who then write the expose. Complaints from provincial and municipal officials about nosy reporters pushed the CCP Propaganda Department to ban the practice of crossregional reporting in 2004.Because the order was largely ignored, a year later provincial leaders raised the issue again, this time at the level of the Politburo. 45 Provincial leaders are a powerful group within the CCP, constituting the largest bloc in the Central Committee and one-quarter of the Politburo. Changing Media, Changing China 21 The interests of these leaders incline them to favor tighter restrictions on investigative journalism. As a result of their complaints, cross-regional reporting has been restricted to stories about officials at the county level or below.Only national-level media dare to publish exposes of provincial and municipal officials, and even then they usually wait until they get wind of an official investigation before reporting on the case. Meanwhile, local officials are learnedness the art of spin they hold press conferences and online chats with Netizens to present an appearance of openness and candorfor example, Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai invited television cameras to broadcast live his negotiations with spectacular taxi drivers in 2009.The expansion of Internet access and the growth of the Web also make it increasingly difficult for local officials to enforce media blackouts on sensitive issues. Several chapters in this book discuss the 2007 case of the Xiamen PX chemical plant, a project ultimately defeated by the militarisation of environmentally conscious public opinion that breached a local media blockade. As Xiao Qiang tells the story (chapter 9), the outcome resulted from the gap in control between local authorities as well as between local and central authorities that can provide a space for Netizens to transmit information. . . One of the most vocal advocates for the issue was the blogger Lian Yue, whose Weblog was not hosted within Fujian Province. Because officials outside Fujian, including the central government, did not share the local governments interest in censoring news about the PX plant, Lian Yue was able to continue his Weblog and even get coverage in newspapers published outside Fujian. MEDIA CREDIBILITY AND GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY Competition from the commercial media and the Web-based media has created what Qian Gang and David Bandurski call a credibility gap problem for the official media.In chapter 2, they compare the ways stories are cover in various kinds of newspapers, vividly illustrating that commercial newspapers reporting is far more informative and reliable than that found in official newspapers. Read ers are abandoning the official media, and their preference is heightened during crises that arouse their interest and motivate them to search for reliable information. 22 Changing Media, Changing China Daniela Stockmann, in chapter 8, provides new data about how people in China choose between different types of news sources.They use the official press to get information on the governments current policy position, but turn to the commercial media and the Internet for credible real news. As she explains, it is the perceived disassociation from the government that lends credibility to the nonofficial media. Stockmann happened to be doing a survey on media usage in Beijing in spring 2005 when student protests against Japan erupted. This serendipity gave her the rare opportunity to compare the way people use the media during normal times and during a crisis.What she sight was that during a crisis, people have a particularly keen nozzle for where to ? nd credible information. Even wh en the propaganda authorities ban reporting of protests and try to homogenize coverage in all types of media, people are more likely to abandon official sources and turn to the commercial press and the Internet than during normal times. The severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic in China in 2003 is referred to by several authors as a turning point in the relations between the government, the media, and the public.By ordering the media to play down early reports of people falling ill with a mysterious disease, a cover-up that allowed the virus to spread and kill more people, Beijing deepened public irresolution about the reliability of the official media and of the government itself. More important, the cover-up taught the public to look to new sources for the true facts. The searing SARS experience also spurred the finis of journalists to meet peoples need for accurate information during a crisis. The ? ght from official sources creates a serious problem for Chinese lea ders, who need to prevent panic and antigovernment reactions during crises. Leaders plausibly worry that a widespread environmental or food safety catastrophe that angers large numbers of people about the same issue at the same time could sweet sand verbena into a revolt against the CCP. Competition from the commercial media and the Web and the narrowing of the information gap between officials and the public forces the government to be more transparent to maintain its credibility.The State Council Information Office and Tsinghua University have trained hundreds of official spokespeople for central, provincial, and municipal government agencies to give press brie? ngs. The central government launched an E-government initiative, and almost every government agency (including very sensitive ones like the Ministry of State Security) now posts information on its Web site. Changing Media, Changing China 23 The trend toward government transparency got a major move on from the Regulations on Open Government Information that went into effect in 2008.The regulations require officials to release information during disasters and emergencies and permit citizens to request the release of government information. An activist took advantage of the opening to request budgets from government agencies. When in October 2009 Guangzhou released departmental budgets and Shanghai refused to do so on the grounds that this information constituted state secrets, the media and online public went wild criticizing Shanghais excuse. 6 Xinhua piled on by reprinting many of the critiques, in